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The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming
macro-prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate
supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated
banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply
by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using
a unique dataset. In the UK, regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum capital
requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign
subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident
foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference
group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one-third of the initial
impulse from the regulatory change.
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1  Introduction 
 
Capital requirements have been a central tool of the prudential regulation of 
banks in most countries for the past three decades. Recently, under Basel III, 
regulators have agreed to vary minimum capital requirements somewhat over time, as 
part of the cyclical mandate of macro-prudential policies.
1 During boom times, capital 
requirements would increase, and during recessions they would decline. That 
variation is intended to achieve three macro-prudential goals: (1) cooling off credit-
fed booms with higher capital requirements, (2) mitigating credit crunches during 
recessions with commensurate reductions in capital requirements, and (3) boosting 
capital and provisioning requirements during booms to provide an additional cushion 
to absorb losses during downturns.
2  
This paper analyses the extent to which this sort of variation in capital 
requirements is effective in regulating the supply of bank lending over the cycle. Our 
analysis is made possible by an apparently unique policy experiment performed in the 
UK during the 1990s and 2000s. As we explain more fully in Section 2, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) varied individual banks’ minimum risk-based capital 
requirements substantially. The extent of this variation across banks in the minimum 
required risk-based capital ratio was large (its minimum was 8%, its standard 
deviation was 2.2%, and its maximum was 23%). The variation in the average capital 
requirement over the business cycle was also large, and tended to be counter-cyclical, 
as envisaged under Basel III. 
Before undertaking our empirical analysis in Sections 2 through 4, we begin 
by reviewing the theoretical foundations of macro-prudential capital regulation and 
the empirical literature relating to those foundations. Three necessary conditions must 
hold true if the time-varying, macro-prudential capital requirements envisioned under 
                                                 
1 In addition to cyclical variation of capital ratios, macro-prudential policy could entail other cyclical variation in policy 
instruments (e.g., liquidity and provisioning requirements) as well as “structural” interventions to promote financial 
stability. For more details, see Tucker (2009, 2011), Galati and Moessner (2011), Bank of England (2009), and Aikman, 
Haldane and Nelson (2010). 
2 As regulations have evolved over time, the complexity of capital regulation has also increased. Under the Basel I 
system, capital requirements consisted of three ingredients: definitions of capital that distinguished between tier 1 and tier 
2 capital, a formula for measuring risk-weighted assets, and setting constant minimum ratios of 8% for the total risk-
based capital (defined as the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital, divided by risk-weighted assets), and 4% for the tier 1 risk-
based capital. Under Basel II, the calculation of risk-weighted assets was modified to permit, under some circumstances,  
the use of internal models and rating agency opinions. Under Basel III, the Basel I minimum ratio is being raised, with a 
greater focus on the common equity component of capital, and the so-called “counter-cyclical capital buffer” implies that 
minimum risk-based capital ratios will now vary over the economic cycle. 3 
 
Basel III are to be effective in controlling system-wide credit growth: (1) equity (the 
key variable of interest in bank capital regulation) must be a relatively costly source 
of bank finance, (2) minimum capital requirement ratios must have binding effects on 
banks’ choice of capital ratios, and (3) when macro-prudential regulation diminishes 
(increases) the supply of credit by banks subject to macro-prudential policy, other 
sources of credit must not fully offset such changes through increases (decreases) in 
the credit supplied by other sources.  
 
Necessary Condition 1: Equity Must Be a Relatively Costly Source of Finance 
The supply of loans from regulated banks will not respond to changes in 
capital requirements unless bank capital is a relatively costly means of financing bank 
activities. If bank leverage were irrelevant to the cost of bank finance – as implied by 
the Miller-Modigliani Theorem – then changes in minimum capital requirements 
would not be useful in reducing credit growth during booms or in mitigating credit 
crunches; banks would costlessly adjust their capital ratios without any effect on their 
lending activities.  
Theoretical models that incorporate the tax benefits of debt finance and 
asymmetric information about banks’ conditions and prospects imply that, in general, 
raising funds from external equity finance is more costly for banks than from debt 
finance, which implies that a rise in capital requirements will raise the cost of bank 
finance, and thus lower the supply of lending.
3 The favourable tax treatment of debt 
results from the deductibility of interest payments, but not dividend payments.  
With respect to the asymmetric information costs of equity, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) show that the adverse-selection costs of raising external equity (which take the 
form of under-pricing of the equity offerings of unobservably healthy banks in their 
                                                 
3 There is also a theoretical literature in banking that discusses how agency problems arising from greater capital or 
capital requirements can give rise to social costs in addition to credit contraction – for example, changes in managerial 
effort or risk preferences. We do not describe this literature, since it is not directly related to the amount of lending, which 
is our focus. For a review of that literature, see VanHoose (2008) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008). Admati et al. 
(2011) express scepticism about the magnitude of equity capital costs for banks. 
 4 
 
model) apply more to junior securities (like equity) than to relatively senior debt 
instruments.
4  
Equity may also be relatively costly as a source of finance because of ex post 
verification costs, another form of asymmetric information. For example, Diamond 
(1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) show that banks that offer debt contracts can 
economize on those costs.
5  
The negative signalling effects of equity offerings modelled by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) will be mitigated if equity offerings respond to an observable 
regulatory change, and so, the raising of equity capital to respond to observable 
changes in macro-prudential regulation will have a lower cost than the raising of 
equity in response to unobservable changes in requirements or other unobservable 
motivations for raising new equity. That does not imply, however, that the imposition 
of observably higher regulatory capital requirements would eliminate the negative 
signalling effects of choosing to issue equity to meet higher regulatory requirements.  
In equilibrium, bank heterogeneity would also result in differences among 
banks in the extent to which they would choose to raise equity as opposed to 
shrinking their risk-weighted assets in response to higher capital requirements. Banks 
in relatively good condition would eschew equity offerings more, ceteris paribus, to 
avoid long-term dilution of incumbent stockholders. For these reasons, higher equity 
capital requirements do not eliminate the information costs, and attendant adverse 
selection risks, that make equity offerings relatively costly.
6  
                                                 
4 The Myers and Majluf (1984) model envisions adverse-selection costs as entirely reflected in the pricing of an equity 
offering, since in their model, there is no technology available to firms to invest in overcoming problems of asymmetric 
information. More realistically, part of the cost of asymmetric information takes the form of paying high underwriting 
costs to investment bankers who market equity offerings. Firms pay those costs to mitigate the more severe adverse 
pricing effects on equity offerings that otherwise would result from asymmetric information (Calomiris and Tsoutsoura 
2011). 
5 Additionally, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that agency problems associated with asymmetric information about 
portfolio realizations will tend to encourage demandable debt contracting rather than long-term debt issuances (in their 
model, equity is supplied entirely by insiders). In that model, requiring bankers to raise the ratio of equity to risky assets 
would result in less lending by banks (since outside equity finance is prohibitively expensive. That model is extended by 
Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001). 
6 Additionally, even if all banks went to the equity market at the same time to raise equity, banks would differ according 
to their investment banking choices; banks whose managers knew that they were in better condition would have an 
incentive to expend more on underwriting to ensure that investors receive more information about their superior 
condition. Those expenditures contribute to the costs of equity capital requirements, and would also have signalling 
effects on the pricing of both high-underwriting cost and low-underwriting cost banks. 5 
 
There is a substantial empirical literature in support of the general proposition 
that equity capital is relatively costly to raise, and that the financing costs of debt 
sources of funding increase in the extent to which the debt claim is more equity-like – 
that is, costs are lowest for deposits, higher for contractual debt and preferred stock 
(which are de jure junior to deposits in many countries and also de facto junior 
because of their longer maturity), higher still for mezzanine instruments (e.g., debt 
that is convertible into equity), and highest for equity.
7 Equity prices tend to decline in 
reaction to an announcement of an equity offering, especially when issuers are 
informationally opaque, and that announcement effect is lower for convertible debt, 
and zero for straight debt (James 1987, James and Wier 1990). Underwriting costs for 
equity are also much higher than for debt (Calomiris 2002). Ediz et al (1998) and 
Francis and Osborne (2009) also find that, consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984), 
UK banks behave as if tier 2 capital is less costly to raise than equity, and that banks 
that have relatively low costs of raising equity raise equity capital more (as opposed to 
contracting risky assets) in response to increases in capital requirements. 
Because the high cost of equity capital is a necessary condition for credit 
supply to respond to either a loss of equity capital or an increase in capital 
requirements, evidence that contractions of credit result from these phenomena is 
powerful evidence that equity finance is costly. The literature on bank “capital 
crunches” documents that shocks to bank equity capital have large contractionary 
effects on the supply of lending (Bernanke 1983, Bernanke and Lown 1991, Kashyap 
and Stein 1995, 2000, Houston, James, and Marcus 1997, Peek and Rosengren 1997, 
2000, Campello 2002, Calomiris and Mason 2003, Calomiris and Wilson 2004, 
Cetorelli and Goldberg 2009).  
Many studies also suggest that increases in regulatory capital requirements can 
precipitate contractions in the supply of credit (see VanHoose 2008 for a review). 
Some of these existing studies analyze banks’ lending behaviour around the time of 
regulatory regime changes (Chiuri et al. 2002), and thus do not isolate the effects of 
bank minimum capital requirement changes, per se. Others analyze cross-sectional 
                                                 
7 The view that junior instruments are more costly sources of finance also explains the common regulatory reluctance to 
impose large increases on banks’ minimum capital ratios. The initial Basel minimum capital requirements were set at 
ratios that were quite close to those prevailing at the time. Indeed, the distinctions between tier 1 and tier 2 capital, and 
the 4% and 8% minimum risk-based capital ratios, were devised in 1988 to allow banks that were subject to the Basel 
guidelines to comply with the new guidelines without raising significant new capital, and despite significant differences 
in the capital structures of banks across countries. 6 
 
differences in lending by banks that differ according to their regulatory circumstances, 
including whether they are the subject of a regulatory action, or whether they have 
relatively small buffers of capital relative to the minimum requirement (e.g., Peek and 
Rosengren 1995a, 1995b, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004). Experiencing a regulatory 
action is a special event, however, and one that is highly endogenous to a variety of 
circumstances that may affect bank lending. Similarly, the relative sizes of banks’ 
capital buffers do not provide a reliable measure of the relative degree to which banks 
are constrained by regulation; the sizes of a banks’ capital buffers are endogenous to 
banks’ particular circumstances, which can produce substantial variation in their 
targeted capital buffers (more on this below). Finally, it is important to control for 
cross-sectional variation in loan demand when measuring the effects of capital 
requirements on loan supply, which only some of the pre-existing studies of lending 
attempt to do.  
To our knowledge, our study is the first analysis of bank-specific responses to 
variation in regulatory minimum capital requirements. Unlike prior studies, we can 
document regulatory capital requirements at the level of individual banks, and we 
show that these requirements vary substantially cross-sectionally and over time. 
Furthermore, when measuring the loan-supply response of banks to capital 
requirements we are able to control for contemporaneous variation in loan demand 
because we have access to detailed information about the composition of bank loan 
portfolios.  Jimenez, Saurina, Ongena, and Peydro (2011) study the effects of bank-
specific changes in dynamic provisioning requirements for Spanish banks. Like our 
study, theirs controls for demand-side influences. Changes in dynamic provisioning 
should be thought of as changes in the “front-loading” of capital requirements against 
risky assets, rather than permanent changes in capital ratio requirements. For that 
reason, the magnitudes of loan-supply reactions to provisioning changes should be 
smaller than the reactions to changes in capital ratio requirements. Thus, the findings 
of Jimenez et al. (2011) – which imply magnitudes of roughly half the size of those 




Necessary Condition 2: Capital Requirements Must Bind 
A second necessary condition for bank capital requirements to affect the loan-
supply decisions of banks is that regulatory capital requirements must continuously 
act as binding constraints on bank capital ratio choices. If market discipline motivates 
banks to maintain ratios of capital far in excess of those required by regulators, then 
changes in regulatory requirements might have no effect on bank capital choices, and 
therefore, no effect on bank loan supply. Calomiris and Mason’s (2004) study of 
credit card banks in the 1990s shows that, under some circumstances, market 
discipline can motivate capital ratios substantially in excess of the regulatory 
minimum.  
When capital requirements bind, the equilibrium amount of total bank capital 
will still exceed the minimum requirement by a buffer chosen to minimize the costs of 
complying with capital requirements.
8 Empirical research has identified substantial 
heterogeneity with respect to bank responses to capital requirements, and particularly, 
the extent to which capital requirements bind on banks’ choices of capital ratios. In 
many studies, actual capital ratios respond strongly to changes in capital 
requirements, but in other studies, there is little observed response, which indicates 
that in some circumstances market discipline may be the dominant influence on 
variation in capital ratios (VanHoose 2008).  
For our sample of UK banks, there have been two studies examining the extent 
to which changes in bank-specific capital requirements affected  actual capital ratios 
(Alfon et al (2005) and Francis and Osborne (2009)). Both studies find a substantial 
impact, and both conclude that capital requirements were binding on capital ratio 
                                                 
8 The dynamic behaviour of buffers is a matter of some theoretical controversy. Repullo and Suarez (2009) derive a 
dynamic model of capital buffers under the Basel II regime. They show that the determination of risk under Basel II 
contributes greatly to the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements (when compared with Basel I); during recessions, capital 
requirements effectively rise. Thus they argue that banks will choose to hold high buffers of capital during expansions, 
anticipating the need for additional capital during recessions, and that this effect is so large that it is not fully mitigated by 
the extent of variation in macro-prudential policy. Aliaga-Diaz et al (2011) develop a dynamic optimization model to 
analyze the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy, based on parameters drawn from Latin American experience. They 
show that variation in capital requirements may have to be large to make macro-prudential policies effective. In their 
framework, however, anticipated reductions in capital requirements due to macro-prudential policy lead banks to 
endogenously choose capital buffers that are smaller during booms than during economic declines. That means that the 
countercyclical effect of capital requirement changes can be mitigated by the endogenous offsetting decisions of banks 
with respect to their chosen buffers. The difference between the conclusions reached by Repullo and Suarez (2009) and 
Aliaga-Diaz et al (2011) about the cyclical properties of capital buffers reflect differences in assumptions about the size 
of macro-prudential capital requirement variation over the cycle and the extent to which recessions are associated with 
substantial changes in risk weights on assets. 8 
 
choices. In Section 2, we confirm that capital requirements appear to have been 
binding on bank capital decisions continuously for our sample of UK banks from 
1998 to 2007. Moreover, since binding regulatory requirements are a necessary 
condition for capital requirement changes to affect bank credit supply, our empirical 
finding in Section 3 – confirming that capital requirement changes have important 
effects on the supply of credit – further corroborates that capital requirements were 
binding. 
 
Necessary Condition 3: Limited Substitutability of Alternative Funding 
The effectiveness of macro-prudential variation in regulatory capital 
requirements depends on limited substitutability between the credit supplied by banks 
that are subject to capital regulation and the financing provided by other sources not 
subject to minimum capital requirements. To the extent that other sources can offer 
substitutes for the loans of regulated domestic banks, there will be offsetting 
“leakages” to macro prudential policy-induced variation in the supply of loans by 
regulated banks. These other sources could include lending by unregulated domestic 
intermediaries, cross-border bank lending and securities offerings (such as 
commercial paper, corporate bonds or equity offerings). 
The theoretical and empirical finance literature suggests that loans from 
intermediaries are not perfect substitutes for securities offerings. Loans involve much 
more detailed contracting terms than bonds – many pages that describe conditions 
pertaining to warranties, covenants, and collateral – which must be custom-designed 
for each loan contract and which require  monitoring and enforcement after the loan is 
made.
9 Furthermore, the importance of “soft” information for limiting the screening, 
monitoring and enforcement costs of bank lending imply that there are limits to the 
ability of offshore lending to substitute for local intermediation, except in the case of 
very large firms that operate internationally, for whom access to local information is 
less relevant.
10 Thus, although “leakages” from all alternative sources of finance 
could potentially offset the variation in loan supply that results from macro-prudential 
                                                 
9 There is a large empirical literature on the special characteristics of loans, beginning with James (1987). 
10 Evidence that local, “soft” information is relevant for most bank lending is provided in various studies, including  
Petersen and Rajan (2002), and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010). 9 
 
regulation of affected banks, the most powerful potential substitute for regulated bank 
lending is lending by local intermediaries that are not subject to domestic capital 
regulation.
11 
The problem of “leakages” involving local intermediaries is particularly acute 
for an economy like the UK, which is a global financial centre. Resident foreign 
branches of banks headquartered abroad are not subject to FSA prudential regulation 
(unlike domestically headquartered banks and resident foreign subsidiaries), but are 
regulated by their home country regulatory authorities (which, during our period, 
typically set capital ratio requirements uniformly at 8% of risk-weighted assets for all 
banks, which was the minimum in the UK).
12 That means that if the FSA decided to 
raise capital requirements, foreign branches operating in the UK could be a significant 
source of leakage.  
Regulatory leakages have understandably been of great concern to 
policymakers engaged in the construction of macro-prudential regimes. In the UK, for 
example, Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of Financial Stability at the Bank of 
England, has frequently commented upon the potential problem of the “dilution” of 
cyclical macro prudential policies, and how this underlines the need for international 
co-ordination: 
Co-operation will be especially important in the deployment of ‘cyclical’ 
instruments. If one country tightens capital or liquidity requirements on 
exposures to its domestic economy, the effect will be diluted if lenders 
elsewhere are completely free to step into the gap. Basel and the EU are 
addressing how to handle that where the instrument is the Basel 3 
Countercyclical Buffer. (Tucker (2011)) 
In Section 4, we investigate the extent to which Deputy Governor Tucker’s concerns 
about dilution are warranted. Specifically, we ask whether foreign branches operating 
                                                 
11 Another aspect of  the UK financial system that limited the potential leakages from sources of funding other than loans 
on banks’ balance sheets was the limited use of loan securitization during our period. Data for the UK show that, prior to 
2009, loan securitization was very small in the aggregate, and that the proportion of securitized loans relative to total 
loans did not vary importantly at high frequency. In preliminary work, we also explored  whether changes in individual 
capital requirements predicts greater issuance of either corporate bonds or equity in sectors that the affected bank is 
competing in. We did not find a statistically significant effect, which suggests that capital markets do not appear to be a 
significant source of leakage in our data. This is consistent with the limited substitutability between bank and bond/equity 
finance.  
12 Such foreign branches account for the majority of banks resident in the UK; in our sample they comprise 173 out of 
277 banks. Moreover, as described in Section 4, these branches account for a non-trivial share of lending to the UK real 
economy, and are important in several sub-sectors of the real economy. See Aiyar (2011) for a more detailed account of 
the structure of the banking industry in the UK, especially relating to the difference between regulated foreign 
subsidiaries and unregulated foreign branches. 10 
 
within the UK increase their lending to “step into the gap” when UK-regulated banks 
experience increases in their capital requirements. We find that this dilution effect 
from leakages is large and statistically significant. 
  In the remainder of the paper, we proceed as follows: Section 2 describes the 
bank-specific UK data base that we employ to measure the relationship between 
changes in capital requirements and changes in lending, reviews the process that 
governed changes in capital requirements, reports summary statistics about changes in 
capital requirements, and describes the relationship between capital ratio requirements 
and capital ratios. We also show that, despite the absence of any explicit macro-
prudential mandate in FSA supervision, average capital requirements across the 
banking system were in fact strikingly counter-cyclical.
13 
Section 3 focuses on the connection between capital requirement changes and 
bank lending for the UK-resident banks that were subject to FSA capital regulation. 
We report regression results that demonstrate a large and statistically significant 
relationship between bank-specific changes in capital requirements and changes in 
bank lending. 
Section 4 estimates the loan supply response of foreign branches operating in 
the UK (which are not subject to FSA capital regulations) to changes in the capital 
requirements imposed on UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries (which 
are subject to FSA capital regulation). We find evidence for large leakages, which 
offset about a third of the effect of capital requirement changes on the lending of UK-
regulated banks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  UK capital regulation, 1998-2007 
 
Our empirical analysis of UK banks’ capital ratio and lending responses to bank 
capital requirement changes is made possible by a regulatory policy regime that set 
bank-specific, time-varying capital requirements. These mimimum capital 
requirement ratios were set for all banks under the jurisdiction of the FSA, i.e. all UK-
owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries. Bank capital requirements are not 
                                                 
13 On the other hand, this should not be entirely surprising, as the term ‘macro-prudential’ originated in the UK in the 
early 1980s (Clement, 2010).  11 
 
public information. We collect quarterly data on capital requirements, and other bank 
characteristics, from the regulatory databases of the Bank of England and FSA. Our 
sample comprises 104 regulated banks (48 UK-owned banks and 56 foreign 
subsidiaries), and 173 unregulated foreign branches operating in the UK. Bank 
mergers are dealt with by creating a synthetic merged data series for the entire period. 
The variables included in this study are listed and defined in Table 1, and Table 2 
reports summary statistics.
14  
Discretionary regulatory policy played a much greater role in the UK’s setting 
of minimum bank capital ratios than in the capital regulation of other countries. A key 
focus of regulation was the so-called “trigger ratio,”: a minimum capital ratio set for 
each bank that would trigger regulatory intervention if breached.
15 Changes in trigger 
ratios were communicated to the Board of Directors of the bank in a formal letter. 
According to Francis and Osborne (2009): 
...the FSA inherited from the Bank of England the practice of supplementing 
the Basel I approach with individual capital requirements, also known as 
‘trigger ratios,’ based on analysis of firm-specific characteristics and 
management practices, and this practice has been retained under Pillar 2 of 
Basel II. These firm-specific requirements are periodically reassessed and, 
where necessary, revised to reflect changing bank conditions and management 
practices. As part of these reviews, the FSA have considered it to be good 
practice in the financial services industry for a UK bank to hold an appropriate 
capital buffer above the individual capital ratios advised by the FSA.... 
UK supervisors set individual capital guidance, also known as ‘trigger ratios,’ 
based on firm-specific reviews and judgments about, among other things, 
evolving market conditions as well as the quality of risk management and 
banks’ systems and controls. These triggers are reviewed every 18-36 months, 
which gives rise to considerable variety in capital adequacy ratios across firms 
and over time. 
 
The authors further note that the unique, bank-specific, discretionary UK 
capital regulation regime was intended to fill the gaps from the early Basel I system, 
which did not consider risks related to variation in interest rates, or legal, reputational 
and operational risks.  Our empirical analysis below confirms that view; changes in 
                                                 
14 The data used in this study exclude outliers based on the following criteria: (1) trivially small banks (with total loans 
less than £3000 on average), or (2) observations for which the absolute value of the log difference of lending in one 
quarter exceeded 1.  
15 The FSA also maintained a separate requirement for a “target ratio,” which was set above the trigger ratio and was 
intended to provide a capital cushion to help prevent an accidental breach of the trigger ratio. In 2001, following the 
Financial Services and Market Act, the FSA stopped setting target ratios, but even before then, the trigger ratio was the 
primary focus of regulatory compliance. 12 
 
capital ratio requirements do not appear to be associated with past or future changes in 
the credit risk of loans (as measured by changes in the non-performing loan ratio). 
Rather, cross-sectional differences in capital ratio requirements (shown in Table 3) are 
associated with identifiable bank-specific characteristics (size, reliance on retail 
deposits, sectoral loan concentration) that could proxy for a variety of other risk 
differences. 
An implication of the view that discretionary variation of bank-specific capital 
ratio requirements set by the FSA reflected differences in operational and interest rate 
risks may explain why capital ratio requirements in excess of 8 percent were viewed 
as less necessary after the implementation of the Basel II system in 2007. The 
introduction of Basel II in 2007 generally resulted in substantial reduction in risk-
weighted assets for a large number of UK banks. 
When measuring the capital requirement (trigger ratio) for risk-based capital 
that is assigned to the individual bank, some complications arise with respect to the 
treatment of the “banking book” and the “trading book” of the bank. For banks that 
had both a banking book and a trading book (which is a characteristic of larger, more 
complex banks, comprising about one-third of the regulated banks in our sample), the 
FSA often assigned different trigger ratios for the banking and trading book, and 
uniformly, the trading book capital requirement is less than or equal to the trigger 
ratio on the banking book. When we describe capital requirements in tables and 
graphs, we will often refer to the “trigger ratio” and “capital requirement ratio,” but 
we will always be referring to the banking-book trigger ratio, which is also the 
measure used in our regression analysis. By focusing on the banking-book trigger 
ratio to measure regulatory changes, our measure captures truly exogenous change, as 
we avoid the distortions that result from endogenous changes in the proportion of 
risk-weighted assets held in the trading book. It is also comparable across banks that 
maintain trading books and those that do not.   
As Table 2 and Figure 1 shows, the variation in capital ratio requirements is 
large. The mean capital requirement ratio is 10.8, the standard deviation is 2.26 , the 
minimum value is 8%, and the maximum value is 23%. Figure 2 displays the 
distribution of changes in capital requirements, which are divided according to the 
change in the size of the capital requirements that are imposed on the banks.  When 
defining capital requirement changes in Figure 2, and in the regression analysis 13 
 
below, we exclude very small changes (changes of less than 10 basis points) which 
result from errors in rounding, and which are reversed in subsequent quarters.
16 Not 
surprisingly, there are no observed changes in capital ratio requirements of between 
10 and 30 basis points. The elimination of rounding errors results in 132 remaining 
observations of changes in banking-book capital requirements in our sample. In 
general, there are more small changes in capital requirements than intermediate or 
large changes, although that pattern is more pronounced for UK-owned banks than 
foreign subsidiaries. As Figure 3 shows, most banks either experienced zero or one 
capital requirement change during our sample period, but 35 banks experienced two 
or more changes.  
Figures 4,  5 and 6 plot the average capital requirement ratio for the regulated 
banking system, with “average” defined in three different ways, against GDP growth. 
Figure 4 takes a simple (non-weighted) average of the capital requirement for all 
regulated banks in the sample. Figure 5 weights these capital requirements by the 
assets of each bank. Figure 6 weights by lending to the real economy rather than by 
assets, and calculates the average capital requirement not directly in levels but by 
cumulating across changes in the capital requirement over successive periods; the 
latter is to ensure that the graph abstracts from changes in the sample of banks 
between time periods due to entry or exit, and only reflects changes in capital 
requirement ratios. All three measures are closely and positively associated with 
movements in GDP (the simple correlation co-efficient is 0.44, 0.52 and 0.64 
respectively, in figures 4, 5 and 6 respectively). The pattern of association is stronger 
for weighted than for non-weighted capital requirements, although the range of 
variation is smaller. Average non-weighted capital requirement ratios ranged from a 
minimum of 10.2% in 2007 to a maximum of 11.2% in 2003.  
This is a striking amount of counter-cyclical variation given that the sample 
period was one of varying positive growth, but no actual recessions. By way of 
comparison, the Basel III countercyclical buffer is to vary between 0 and 2.5% over 
the entire business cycle inclusive of recessions.
17 Thus, although the FSA lacked any 
                                                 
16 Our method of computing the trigger ratio requires that one divide required capital by risk-weighted assets, which 
creates very small rounding errors that give rise to small implied “changes” in required capital ratios, which not 
economically significant changes.  
17 Furthermore, variation in the UK trigger ratio is a stricter embodiment of change over the cycle, given that the failure 
to meet the trigger ratio can have dire consequences for a bank, while a failure to meet the new Basel III countercyclical 
capital buffer has more limited consequences (i.e., limits on the distributions of earnings to shareholders). 14 
 
explicit macro-prudential mandate over the period, the outcome of its decisions made 
on a bank-by-bank basis was in fact macro-prudential in nature. This provides an ideal 
testing ground for the likely efficacy of future explicitly macro-prudential regimes. 
After 2006, around the time Basel II was introduced
18, capital requirements 
declined markedly, and this happened in spite of an acceleration of growth, which was 
contrary to the previous pattern of counter-cyclical changes in requirements. That 
pattern differs from the rises of prior expansionary periods, although the decline is 
less pronounced for weighted capital requirements than for non-weighted capital 
requirements (which actually fell during the 2006-2007 expansion).  As noted above, 
the introduction of Basel II (which was designed to provide a more comprehensive 
measure of bank risks than the prior system) may have led to supervisors to place less 
reliance on discretionary setting of bank-specific capital ratios above 8 percent. 
 To understand the FSA’s approach to setting capital requirements better, it is 
useful to divide the sources of variation in capital ratio requirements into three sets of 
factors: (1) capital requirement differences that reflect long-term cross-sectional 
differences in bank type, operations or condition, (2) high-frequency cross-sectional 
changes in bank operations or condition that capture, for example, sudden changes in 
bank loan quality, and (3) variation over time in average minimum capital 
requirements for banks that reflect what could be termed macro-prudential goals.  Of 
these, the variation over the cycle has already been discussed above; below we 
document variation in the long-term cross-sectional characteristics of banks and high 
frequency cross-sectional changes. 
In Table 3, we report summary statistics for average long-term bank 
characteristics and relate those to average capital ratios. The long-term bank 
characteristics we examine are: size, liability mix, loan write-off ratio, and 
concentration. Across the four quartiles of average required capital ratios, higher 
capital requirements are monotonically associated with smaller bank size and a 
smaller proportion of what could be termed “core” deposits (the sum of sight and time 
deposits, which excludes repos, certificates of deposit, and all non-depository sources 
of funding). Higher capital requirements are also monotonically increasing in sectoral 
concentration, defined as a bank’s lending to the sector to which it has the greatest 
                                                 
18 Basel II was formally introduced on January 2007 in the UK, but the transition period most likely started before that. 15 
 
exposure divided by the bank’s total lending.
19  With respect to loan write-offs, banks 
in the highest quartile of average capital requirements have substantially higher write-
offs, but within the first three quartiles of average capital requirements, banks do not 
differ with respect to write-offs. 
At high frequency—examining responses of capital requirements to quarterly 
changes in bank behaviour over the prior four quarters—we found practically no 
connection between changes in bank condition and changes in capital requirements. 
High-frequency changes in write-offs were negatively correlated with capital 
requirement changes that occurred within the same quarter, indicating that when some 
banks experienced large write-offs (resulting in diminished capital) regulators 
occasionally reduced those banks’ minimum capital ratios. It is possible that high-
frequency increases in write-offs are moments when supervisors believe that ongoing 
uncertainty about prospective bank losses has been resolved, in which case it may 
make sense to reduce capital requirements accordingly. This high-frequency 
connection between write-offs and capital requirements explained only about one 
percent of the panel variation in capital requirements.
20 In our regression results 
reported below, we further investigate whether changes in minimum capital ratio 
requirements are related to past or future changes in non-performing loan ratios, and 
we find that minimum capital ratios are orthogonal to past or future non-performing 
loan ratios.  
Overall, therefore, we find substantial variation across banks and over time in 
minimum capital requirements, and we find that changes in capital requirements are 
correlated with long-term bank characteristics, as well as cyclical changes in 
economic and market conditions, but not strongly associated with identifiable  high-
frequency changes in banks’ circumstances.    
  As a rough gauge of the extent to which capital requirements were binding on 
bank behaviour, Figure 6 plots the co-movements between weighted capital ratios and 
                                                 
19 Lending here refers to non-financial sector, non-household lending. The household sector is excluded from the measure 
of concentration because lending to households is not comparable in concentrating risk to lending to a particular sector. 
For many banks lending to households is by far the biggest individual lending category. The large size of the household 
sector means that a bank specializing in household lending may be well diversified within the sector, e.g. regionally or 
across different types of consumer loans, and thus less risky. At any rate, this appears to have been the view of the 
regulators: including household lending in the definition of concentration used here eliminates the monotonic relationship 
between sectoral concentration and capital requirements. 
20 If supervisors believe that write-offs resolve ongoing uncertainty about prospective bank losses, it may make sense to 
reduce capital requirements accordingly. 16 
 
weighted capital ratio requirements over time, with banks sorted into quartiles 
according to the buffer over minimum capital requirements.  For all four groups of 
banks, the variation in capital requirements was associated with substantial co-
movement in capital ratios, confirming the conclusions of Alfon et al (2005) and 
Francis and Osborne (2009) that capital ratio requirements were binding on banks’ 
choices of capital ratios for UK banks during this sample period.  
 
 
3  The effect of minimum capital requirement changes on lending by affected 
banks 
 
In this Section, we estimate the effect of capital requirement changes on bank lending. 
Our measure of bank lending is loans to the non-financial sector. We construct that 
measure by aggregating all of the sectoral loan categories of a bank’s lending except 
for its loans to financial institutions. As discussed in Section 1, changes in capital 
requirements should affect lending by a regulated bank only when bank equity is 
relatively expensive to raise, and when regulatory requirements are binding 
constraints.
21  
When seeking to measure the effects on bank loan supply from increased 
capital requirements it is important to recognize, and control for, variation in bank 
lending due to changes in loan demand, which is also likely to vary across banks 
(according to their sectoral specializations), and over the cycle. To identify loan-
supply responses to capital requirement changes, in this Section, we control for loan-
demand changes in several alternative ways. Following Aiyar (2011), the basic 
strategy is to exploit differences in the sectoral concentration of lending by different 
banks to identify cross-sectional differences in loan demand faced by different banks.  
For each bank, we construct three different measures of sectoral loan demand 
as follows: in any quarter, each sector’s total lending is measured by aggregating all 
lending into that sector by other banks in the sample. Denote that variable as Ziqt , 
                                                 
21 We model the effects of capital requirement changes on loan supply. We do not model the process through which 
capital ratio requirements affect capital ratios, although our estimation of loan-supply effects does allow banks with 
different “buffers” between minimum and actual capital ratios to respond differently to increases in capital requirements. 
We focus on loan-supply effects for two reasons: First, loan-supply is the primary variable of interest. Second, as we 
discuss further below, buffers vary substantially and persistently across banks, and banks with relatively large buffers 
tend to exhibit greater responsiveness to capital ratio requirement changes, not less. Heterogeneity in buffers likely 
reflects unobservable bank characteristics associated with the costs of raising capital.   17 
 
where t indexes the quarter, q indexes the sector and i indexes the bank for which it is 
constructed. Allowing small-case letters to denote logs, ∆ziqt represents percentage 
changes in sectoral lending thus constructed. Then we aggregate across sectors, 
weighting the change in lending in each sector by that sector’s importance to bank i; 
thus zit= ∑q siqt-1∆ziqt, where siqt denotes the share of sector q in bank i’s lending 
portfolio in period t.  
The variable zit serves as our first measure of bank-specific loan demand. 
However, the measure is imperfect because growth in aggregate lending by all other 
banks may still reflect the common supply-side effect of macro-prudential policy. We 
construct two additional measures designed to address that problem. First, for each 
sector we simply subtract total (non-sectorally weighted) bank lending growth for all 
banks from the bank-specific measure zit. This subtraction should remove supply-side 
influences that are common to both total bank lending and sectorally-weighted bank 
lending, leaving only the bank-specific weighted sectoral deviations of loan growth, 
which should reflect demand-side influences. We call this measure “adjusted z”. Our 
second approach is to regress  zit on the time series average (asset-weighted) change 
in bank capital requirements. The bank-specific time series residual from that 
regression is a proxy for loan demand growth faced by that particular bank. We call 
this measure “residual z”. 
Thus the general specification is: 
it
k
k it k t
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where  it l   denotes lending growth in period t by bank i,  it KRR  denotes the 
change in the capital requirement ratio,  i  is a bank-specific fixed effect, and X is a 
vector of controls. zit is the demand proxy discussed above, in any of its three 
varieties. 
Both the contemporaneous change in capital requirements and three lags are 
included in the equation. On the basis of regulatory data we only observe a change in 
the capital requirement when the trigger ratio in a particular report differs from the 
trigger ratio in the preceding report from three months earlier; we do not know when, 18 
 
within that three month period, the change in capital requirements was introduced. 
Moreover, it is possible that FSA regulators—who maintain an ongoing dialogue with 
the banks they supervise—might inform a bank in advance of a forthcoming change 
in the capital requirement ratio. Both these considerations indicate the necessity for a 
contemporaneous term of the dependant variable in addition to lags. 
  Table 4a reports five versions of our baseline loan-supply regressions. All 
specifications are estimated in a panel fixed-effects framework, where the bank-
specific fixed effect should capture heterogeneity in lending growth arising from 
relatively long-run, time-invariant bank characteristics.
22 The first column does not 
include any controls. The second column introduces the raw value of z as a control, 
together with the standard macroeconomic variables used as controls in other studies, 
GDP growth and inflation.
23 The third and fourth columns substitute the raw value of 
z with, respectively, the adjusted z and residual z demand proxies discussed above. 
The fifth column introduces bank-specific characteristics as additional controls. 
Specifically, we include TIER1, RISK, SUB, and BIG. TIER1 is Francis and 
Obsborne’s (2009) measure of a bank’s low cost of equity capital relative to other 
banks (which is revealed by its relatively high dependence on tier 1 capital). RISK is a 
measure of the riskiness of bank assets: the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
assets. SUB is an indicator variable that captures whether the bank is a subsidiary of a 
foreign bank. BIG is an indicator variable that captures whether the bank has assets in 
excess of £10 billion.  
  We find that loan supply responds negatively to increases in capital 
requirements. The parameter of interest is tightly estimated across the full range of 
specifications. Summing across lags of the change in the capital requirement ratio 
yields estimates between 0.065 and 0.072.That is, an increase in the capital 
requirement ratio of 100 basis points induces, on average, a cumulative fall in lending 
                                                 
22 A fixed effects specification is preferred to random effects because we have no strong prior that the bank-specific effect 
is not correlated with other explanatory variables—as required by random effects. Post-estimation Hausman tests reject 
the null of a random effects specification. 
23 A key macroeconomic variable that could potentially affect lending growth is monetary policy, and indeed, there is a 
rich literature documenting this effect, such as the seminal Kashyap and Stein (2000). We have experimented extensively 
with including monetary policy as an explanatory variable, but because of the subtlety of the issues raised, in particular, 
possible interactions between monetary policy and changes in regulatory capital requirements, we defer these results to a 
separate forthcoming working paper (Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2011)). Here we note only the most pertinent 
finding from that work: while we find, in conformity with the literature, that monetary policy affects bank lending, its 
impact appears to be orthogonal to the impact of regulatory capital requirements. 19 
 
growth of between 6.5 and 7.2 percentage points.
24 Higher GDP growth is 
unsurprisingly associated with more rapid lending growth, while the (sector-based) 
demand controls are insignificant, suggesting that demand conditions tend to vary 
quite uniformly across sectors. Bank-specific balance sheet characteristics used as 
controls in other studies  (TIER1, RISK, SUB, and BIG) are not significant. 
  Two separate concerns regarding endogeneity arise for the specifications in 
Table 4a. First, the relationship of interest might be subject to reverse causality. The 
bank regulator could be responding to overly rapid loan growth by increasing the 
responsible bank’s minimum capital requirement. However, if this were the case, our 
results for the responses of loan supply are even stronger than reported, because such 
behaviour by the regulator would tend to generate a positive co-efficient between loan 
supply and changes in capital requirements. 
  Second, and of perhaps greater import, underlying changes to the quality of 
the bank’s loan portfolio could be driving both regulatory changes in minimum capital 
ratios and changes in credit supply, thereby generating a spurious correlation between 
the latter two variables. To address this potential problem we examined the 
contemporaneous correlation between a proxy for loan quality—write-offs—and 
minimum capital requirements, and found none. Moreover, we found that the change 
in capital requirements for a bank cannot be predicted by contemporaneous, lagged, or 
future values of changes in write-offs. This suggests that poorly performing loan 
books are not the main driver behind changes in capital regulatory requirements. 
While banks which have relatively high write-offs over the whole time-series on 
average have higher minimum capital requirements than banks which have relatively 
low write-offs (as shown in Table 3), this systematic difference applies only to the 
cross-section. 
Of course, it may still be the case that changes in loan quality affect loan 
supply for reasons unrelated to capital requirements, and indeed, we find evidence 
that this is the case in our sample. Table 4b shows the same regressions as Table 4, 
but with contemporaneous and lagged values of changes in write-offs introduced as 
additional explanatory variables. If deteriorating loan books were driving both 
changes in capital requirements and changes in credit supply, then we should find that 
                                                 
24 Strictly speaking, the cumulative impact on lending growth will differ from these estimates due to compounding. 20 
 
the coefficients on the regulatory changes become insignificant, or diminish in 
magnitude. In fact, the coefficients on capital requirement changes are almost 
identical to those in Table 4, suggesting that changes in write offs and changes in 
miminum capital ratios are orthogonal. We do find, however, that deteriorating loan 
portfolios exercise a negative impact on credit supply (columns 4 and 5), but that 
impact is independent of the impact of regulatory changes. 
It is also possible that regulators change capital requirements in anticipation of 
future deterioration in loan portfolio quality (and that banks reduce credit supply 
motivated by the same anticipation). Table 4c accordingly shows the same regressions 
as Table 4b, but with contemporaneous and leading values of changes in write-offs 
(rather than lags) introduced as additional explanatory variables. But the impact of 
leads of write-offs on credit supply is statistically insignificant, while the impact of 
regulatory capital changes remains robust. 
As a further robustness check, we estimated, but do not report, the 
specifications in Table 4a with time dummies instead of macroeconomic controls. The 
coefficient magnitudes on the capital requirement ratio variable were qualitatively 
very similar. We also experimented with an autoregressive version of the specification 
above, while omitting fixed effects. Using fixed effects in an autoregressive 
framework introduces bias via the correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the fixed effects. While this could in principle be addressed using GMM 
techniques, the instrumentation schemes tend to be very data intensive, and we 
believe are not appropriate for the sample studied here.
25 Instead we follow recent 
empirical contributions, such as the one-step procedure in Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
and the internal capital markets specifications in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008), in 
omitting fixed effects in these specifications, using random effects instead. Again, the 
results are very similar qualitatively. 
                                                 
25 GMM techniques are most useful in “large N, small T” settings. Under Difference and System GMM (Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998)), the instrument count is quartic in the time dimension, which in our case 
numbers slightly under 40 periods (relative to 104 regulated banks in the sample). A large set of instruments leads to 
biased estimates through overfitting endogenous variables. Roodman (2000) suggests as a rule of thumb that the number 
of instruments should never outnumber the panel’s individual units, and simulations indicate considerable bias even in the 
presence of much smaller instrument sets relative to the number of panel units. Moreover, since the number of elements 
in the estimated variance matrix of the moments is quadratic in the instrument count, it is quartic in T. So a finite sample 
is unlikely to contain adequate information to estimate the matrix well for large T. 21 
 
In a recent paper on fiscal policy, Romer and Romer (2010) argue that their 
‘narrative’ measure of tax changes is exogenous with respect to output. They use both 
a single equation approach, under the assumption that their tax measure is exogenous, 
and a VAR, assuming that output and their measure are jointly endogenous, to 
estimate the effect of changes in taxes on output. Based on the finding that estimates 
from both methods are very similar, they conclude that their measure is indeed 
exogenous with respect to output. We followed a similar procedure and estimated a 
panel VAR to assess endogeneity is a serious problem in our application. These 
results are presented in appendix B. In general, of course, coefficient magnitudes from 
the single equation specifications reported here and the panel VAR will be different. 
But, in the absence of endogeneity bias, conditional on a correct VAR identification 
scheme, and other conditions (discussed in more detail in Appendix B), the VAR and 
single-equation results should be  similar. As we show in appendix B, all of these 
restrictive conditions appear to be met since the cumulative value of the lending 
growth impulse response to a capital requirements shock is  4.6%, similar to the single 
equation cumulative sum of coefficients of about 6.4%. This suggests that the 
restrictive assumptions necessary for the single equation model to provide an 
unbiased estimate of the change in capital requirement on lending growth do not 
appear to be rejected by data.  
In the absence of strong instrumental variables, of course, it is not possible to 
definitively rule out endogeneity. However, the fact that our results are robust to leads 
and lags of writeoffs, along with the striking similarity between the panel VAR and 
single-equation estimates, suggest that the estimates presented in Tables 4-6 are likely 
not contaminated by serious endogeneity bias.  
Table 5 looks more carefully at the role played by the capital buffer, and by 
bank size, by introducing a term interacting the change in the capital requirement with 
dummy variables for, respectively, banks in the lowest quartile of buffer size, banks in 
the lower half of buffer size, banks in the highest quartile of bank size and banks in 
the upper half of bank size. Column 1 suggests that the response of a bank in the first 
quartile of capital buffers—i.e. a bank which has an average (over time) capital buffer 
which is “low” relative to other banks—to a change in capital requirements is smaller 
than the response of a bank which is not in this quartile. This effect is not statistically 22 
 
significant. But, as shown in column 2, there is a significant difference in the 
responsiveness of banks which have an average capital buffer below that of the 
median bank.  
This finding is consistent with recognizing the endogeneity of capital buffers 
to bank-specific characteristics. Banks with relatively easy access to capital markets 
choose to hold smaller buffers, and have a smaller loan supply response to changes to 
capital requirements. On the other hand, banks which find it difficult to access capital 
markets choose to hold larger buffers and also have a larger loan supply response to 
changes in capital requirements. These results are analogous to a well-known 
phenomenon in the investment literature: firms with larger cash holdings exhibit 
greater cash flow sensitivity of investment, and even greater cash flow sensitivity of 
cash (Calomiris, Himmelberg, Wachtel (1995), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004), Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2006)). Moreover, as illustrated by columns 
3 and 4, it appears that bank size is a (noisy) indicator of capital buffers, with larger 
banks tending to hold smaller capital buffers and vice-versa.
26 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show no statistically significant difference in the 
responsiveness of loan supply by banks in the upper quartile of the size distribution. 
This result is somewhat surprising, since one would expect larger banks to find it less 
expensive to raise capital, and thus to reduce loan supply less in response to an 
increase in capital requirements. In forthcoming work (Aiyar, Calomiris and Weiladek 
(2012)) we find that, in some specifications, particularly when monetary policy and 
capital requirement changes are modelled simultaneously, size interactions can matter 
for the responsiveness of loan supply to capital requirement changes. Thus, the 
“rejection” of size effects in Table 5 is not robust to more complicated specifications 
of the policy environment. 
Finally, it is worth noting that while we have presented strong evidence that 
banks react to stricter capital requirements by adjusting credit supply, a regression of 
changes in actual (nominal) capital on changes in the capital requirement ratio finds 
no significant relationship. So it appears as though banks change their capital to risk-
                                                 
26 This finding is consistent with (although not equivalent to) evidence that larger banks tend to hold less capital in a large 
cross-country sample of banks (Cihak and Schaek (2007)). 23 
 
weighted assets ratio in response to regulatory tightening by adjusting the 
denominator rather than the numerator.  
 
4  Leakages associated with foreign branches 
 
In Section 3, we showed that UK-regulated banks exhibit a strong  loan-supply 
response to changes in required capital ratios. Here we explore the extent to which 
those loan-supply effects are mitigated by endogenous loan-supply decisions by 
foreign branches operating in the UK, which are not subject to domestic UK capital 
regulation. As noted in Section 1, such branches may “step into the gap” created by 
macro-prudential policy; when capital-regulated banks contract their loan supply, 
unregulated banks operating in the UK may offer substitute sources of credit to 
borrowers.  
  As Figure 7 shows, the aggregate amount of lending by foreign branches is 
substantial, although smaller than the aggregate amount of lending by banks that are 
subject to UK capital regulation. Moreover, branch lending is not confined to one or 
two sectors, but is rather broad-based. In four sectors lending by branches accounts 
for 40% or more of total sectoral lending.  
   Our empirical strategy is to regress foreign branch lending growth on the 
instrumented lending of a “reference group” of regulated banks. The instrument is the 
change in capital requirements that occurred for that reference group. We report 
results for reference groups defined alternatively as the entire set of regulated banks, 
or as a branch-specific reference group weighted by the sectoral exposures of the 
branch. As before, we use the “residual of z” to proxy for loan demand.  
Thus the specification is: 
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jt l  denotes lending growth by the foreign branch j and 
REF
jt l   denotes 
lending growth by branch j’s reference group of regulated banks.  Note that j indexes 
branches, while i is reserved to index regulated banks. 
REF




jt KRR  . And both 
REF
jt l   and 
REF
jt KRR   come in aggregate and 
branch-specific varieties, whose precise construction is described below. 
Let  qt z ~  denote the log of aggregate lending by all regulated banks to sector q 
in period t. Then the aggregate variety of 
REF
jt l   is constructed as:    
q qt
REF
jt z l ~ ,  
and the branch-specific variety is constructed as:       q qt jqt
REF
jt z s l ~
1 . Note that the 
aggregate variety of 
REF
jt l  is identical for all branches. 
The aggregate variety of 
REF
jt KRR  is simply defined as: 
     i it it
REF
jt KRR KRR 1  , where it  denotes economy-wide lending by bank i as a 
share of economy-wide lending by all regulated banks in period t. Again, note that the 
aggregate variety of 
REF
jt KRR  is identical for all branches. 
Let       i it iqt qt KRR KRR 1  where  iqt  denotes lending by bank i to sector q 
as a share of lending by all regulated banks to sector q in period t. This is a measure of 
the sector-specific change in capital requirements in each period. Then the branch-
specific variety of 
REF
jt KRR  is defined as:       q qt jqt
REF
jt KRR s KRR 1 . 
Note that 
REF
jt l    is defined in terms of weighted changes in regulated bank 
lending, and that the weights—the sectoral exposure pattern of the branch—are taken 
for the previous period. This is to ensure that that 
REF
jt l   reflects actual changes in 
lending by relevant regulated banks, rather than simply changes in the sample of 
regulated banks across time periods (because of entry or exit of some regulated banks 
from the sample). Identical considerations apply to the construction of 
REF
jt KRR  . 
Again, both the contemporaneous term and lags of the independent variable of 
interest—reference group lending—are included in the specification. If banks are 
made aware by the FSA of an impending increase in capital requirements, those banks 
are in turn likely to inform loan customers of an intent to contract lending (e.g. by 
reducing or eliminating lines of credit as they mature). Bank borrowers, therefore, 25 
 
may seek new lending relationships that begin simultaneous with the contraction in 
loan supply induced by changing capital requirements. 
The instruments we use have considerable intuitive appeal in this application. 
We have shown in the previous section that lending by regulated banks responds 
strongly to changes in capital requirements. Moreover, it is hard to imagine any 
channel through which changes in capital requirements could affect lending by 
unregulated banks except via the impact on lending by regulated banks. 
Table 6 presents results from instrumental variables regressions. Columns 1 
through 3 report results using the aggregate reference group of all regulated banks, 
while columns 4 through 6 report results from using a branch-specific reference group 
as described above. Columns 1 and 4 include no controls. Columns 2 and 5 include 
our preferred “residual z” demand control. Columns 3 and 6 include, in addition, GDP 
growth, inflation, and three branch-specific variables: SIZE, KAR and WHL.
27 SIZE 
is the log of the bank’s total assets. KAR is a measure of leverage, the capital asset 
ratio. WHL is a measure of reliance on wholesale funding, being the ratio of repo 
liabilities to total liabilities.  
We find that lending by foreign branches is strongly negatively related to 
instrumented lending by the foreign branch’s reference group. That is, a reduction in 
loan supply by regulated banks in response to tighter capital requirements indeed 
induces an increase in loan supply by unregulated foreign branches.  The result on 
leakages holds for both the broad and narrow reference group specifications, but the 
results are, unsurprisingly, stronger for the branch specific reference group. Table 6 
also reports a set of post-estimation statistics. The Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions indicates that capital requirements weighted by branch-
specific sectoral exposures are much better instruments than the unweighted change in 
capital requirements. Conventional tests for weakness of instruments—for example 
comparing the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic against critical values for an 
“acceptable” level of bias—are not possible, because the relevant critical values have 
                                                 
27 Foreign branches do not file the BSD3 report on capital adequacy which we used to construct the bank-specific balance 
sheet controls in Table 4. But they are required to report (less detailed) balance sheet data using the BT form, which are 
used to construct the control variables here. 26 
 
not been tabulated.
28 However, to assuage concerns about weak instruments, we 
report two tests for robust inference in the presence of weak instruments.
29  
What do these numbers say about the magnitude of leakages from prudential 
regulation? The simple average of the coefficients estimated in the branch-specific 
specifications 4 through 6 is 2.67. That is, the cumulative impact of a capital 
requirement-induced reduction of 1% in lending growth by regulated banks is an 
increase in lending growth of 2.67% by foreign branches. As noted earlier, regulated 
banks are, on average, much bigger than foreign branches and lend more into the real 
economy. Across the sample, quarterly lending by the average regulated bank was 
£9.5 million, about 15 times larger than quarterly lending by the average foreign 
branch, which stood at £630,000. On the other hand, there are more foreign branches 
(173) in our cross section than regulated banks (104). The product of these ratios 
between branches and regulated banks yields a rough estimate of leakages. Thus, over 
our sample period, the regulatory leakage from foreign branches amounted to just 
under one-third: 29.4% =  (2.67*(63/950)*(173/104)*100).  
It appears, therefore, that over the sample period leakages from non-UK 
regulated banks operating in the UK were qualitatively and quantitatively important.
30 
Leakages substantially reduced, but did not fully offset, the contractionary credit-
supply impact of a tightening in capital requirements. The estimates reported here 
likely represent a lower bound on the size of total regulatory leakages, which could 
also occur through cross-border lending or via capital markets, but, as noted earlier, 
there are good reasons for believing that foreign branch lending comprises the major 
element of such leakages. This evidence validates the focus on reciprocal 
arrangements between financial regulators to prevent leakages from forthcoming 
                                                 
28 See Stock and Yogo (2002). The authors tabulate critical values for various combinations of number of endogenous 
regressors and number of instruments. 
 
29 Results are given for the Anderson-Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright S test. The null hypothesis tested in both cases is 
that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and, in addition, that 
the overidentifying restrictions are valid.  Both tests are robust to the presence of weak instruments.  The tests are 
equivalent to estimating the reduced form of the equation (with the full set of instruments as regressors) and testing that 
the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero (see Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) for further 
discussion).  Both tests indicate rejection of the null across all specifications. 
30 As a robustness check we also estimated the “leakage” regressions in reduced form, i.e., we estimated various 
specifications in which lending by branch j is regressed directly on contemporaneous and lagged values of changes in the 
reference group’s minimum capital requirement. These results support the instrumental variables results noted here. 
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macro-prudential regimes, e.g. the reciprocity principle enshrined in the Basel III 
counter-cyclical capital buffer. 
 
5  Concluding Remarks 
 
We consider the consequences for bank credit supply of macro-prudential capital 
regulation, using a unique UK “policy experiment” (the practice of setting bank-
specific, time-varying capital requirements) to gauge the potential effectiveness of 
macro-prudential changes in bank capital requirements. We employ data on individual 
banks operating in the UK from 1998 to 2007.  
  For macro-prudential policy to be effective in controlling the aggregate 
amount of lending in an economy, three necessary conditions must be satisfied: (1) it 
must be relatively costly to raise equity capital, (2) regulatory capital requirements 
must bind on banks, and (3) macro-prudential “leakages” – substitutes for regulated 
banks’ lending – must not be able to fully offset the loan-supply effects of variation in 
capital requirements. The UK evidence suggests that all three conditions were 
satisfied. 
Banks that were subject to UK capital regulation display large and statistically 
significant responses in their loan-supply behaviour to changes in regulatory capital 
requirements. The loan-supply behaviour of banks that were not subject to UK capital 
requirements – foreign bank branches operating in the UK – responded to increases in 
UK capital requirements by increasing their loan supply, even as regulated banks 
contracted lending. This leakage was large, amounting to about a third of the 
aggregate change in loan supply that otherwise would have resulted. That conclusion 
reinforces the need for macro-prudential regulators to coordinate changes in capital 
requirements to prevent regulatory arbitrage by banks that can avoid domestic bank 
regulation. 
Our estimates of the effects of changes in capital requirements on lending 
supply to the real economy may seem large, especially when compared to recent 
estimates of this effect produced by the Bank of International Settlements (2011).
31 
                                                 
31 We estimate an elasticity of loan supply for regulated banks with respect to the minimum capital ratio requirement of 
roughly negative one, and the net effect (after taking account of foreign branches' partially offsetting response) is two-28 
 
But the BIS study is based on macroeconomic data. The econometric identification of 
loan-supply responses is much more challenging in a macroeconomic context. 
Macroeconomic aggregates would be affected by the leakages via foreign branches 
analyzed in our study. They would also be affected by other potential regulatory 
leakages, resulting in a smaller net effect on loan supply from any change in capital 
requirements. Our results are therefore not necessarily inconsistent with estimates 
from macroeconomic data, but they are more precise in delineating how individual 
responses to regulatory change lead, in the aggregate, to changes in system-wide 
credit supply.  Our findings also emphasize that the effect of capital requirements on 
aggregate lending may become stronger once the reciprocity agreement embedded in 
Basel III becomes enforced and the branch leakage documented in this paper is 
eliminated. 
Finally, our results—based on the 1998-2007 UK sample—should not be 
interpreted as providing a definitive measure of the size of loan-supply responses by 
regulated banks, or leakages from other banks, either in the future for the UK, or in 
other countries. The extent to which foreign branches constitute a leakage depends 
upon their relative size, which has been growing over time in the UK. Furthermore, 
differences across countries in the structure of their financial systems are likely to 
play a fundamental role, as well, both for the loan-supply responses of regulated 
banks and the relevant sources of leakage from other lenders.  
                                                                                                                                            
thirds of that. These large magnitudes are consistent with another observation noted in our study: that capital does not 
increase when capital ratio requirements are raised. 29 
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Variable Definition  Source   








assets (RWA) for 
the banking book. 
Also known as 
“Trigger ratio”. 
BSD3  
Lending Bank  lending  to 
non-financial 
sectors of the 
economy 
AL  
TIER1  Ratio of Tier 1 
capital to RWA. 
BSD3  
SIZE  Total assets  BSD3 / BT  BSD3 for regulated 
banks; BT for 
foreign branches. 
BIG  Dummy variable = 
1 when SIZE is in 
highest decile. 
BSD3  
RISK  Ratio of RWA to 
total assets. 
BSD3  
SUB  Dummy variable = 
1 when bank is a 
resident subsidiary 
of a foreign bank. 
 Information  from 





BUF Difference  between 
actual capital and 
the capital 
requirement ratio, 
divided by RWA. 
BSD3  
KAR  Capital asset ratio  BT   
WHL Ratio  of  repo 
liabilities to total 
liabilities 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Average capital requirement ratio by various bank attributes 1/ 
                      Percentiles 
Variable  25 <  25-50  50-75  > 75 
Writeoffs 2/ 















(0.10)     
10.63 




Retail Deposits 4/ 




(15.4)     
10.08 




Sectoral Specialisation 5/ 




(39.4)     
10.90 
(59.3)     
11.25 
(89.4)      
1/ The mean values of the variables within each quartile are provided in brackets below the           
associated mean capital requirement. 
2/ Defined as total amount written-off as a share of risk-weighted assets. 
3/ Defined as asset size relative to total assets of the banking system. 
4/ Defined as the sum of sight and time deposits as a fraction of total liabilities. 
5/ Defined as lending to the sector to which the bank has the greatest exposure in percent of 






















































Change in capital requirement ratio (summed lags) ‐0.0676*** ‐0.0645*** ‐0.0657*** ‐0.0684** ‐0.0716***
(Prob > F) 0.0021 0.002 0.002 0.013 0.0049
DEMAND (summed lags) 0.268 0.238 0.081 0.087
(Prob > F) 0.545 0.697 0.86 0.85
Demand variable z Adjusted zR e s i d u a l  zR e s i d u a l  z
GDP growth (summed lags) 0.0597** 0.0575** .0475* 0.0496**
(Prob > F) 0.023 0.033 0.063 0.05
Inflation (summed lags) ‐0.0014 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0054 ‐0.004













































Change in capital requirement ratio (summed lags) ‐0.0677*** ‐0.062*** ‐0.0637*** ‐0.0695** ‐0.0727***
(Prob > F) 0.0022 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.01
Change in write‐offs (summed lags) ‐0.0172 ‐0.0192 ‐0.0195 ‐0.036** ‐0.0358**
(Prob > F) 0.264 0.179 0.198 0.026 0.028
DEMAND (summed lags) 0.289 0.292 0.125 0.135
(Prob > F) 0.504 0.63 0.77 0.757
Demand variable z Adjusted zR e s i d u a l  z Residual z
GDP growth (summed lags) 0.061** 0.059** 0.052** 0.0542**
(Prob > F) 0.021 0.029 0.043 0.035
Inflation (summed lags) 0 ‐0.011 ‐0.002 ‐0.001







































Change in capital requirement ratio (summed lags) ‐0.0534*** ‐0.0488*** ‐0.0508*** ‐0.0593** ‐0.0608**
(Prob > F) 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.019 0.015
Change in write‐offs (summed leads) 0.0109 0.014 0.0129 ‐0.001 ‐0.001
(Prob > F) 0.6 0.477 0.0532 0.913 0.94
DEMAND (summed lags) 0.604 0.626 0.302 0.262
(Prob > F) 0.241 0.336 0.582 0.647
Demand variable z Adjusted zR e s i d u a l  zR e s i d u a l  z
GDP growth (summed lags) 0.053* 0.0471* 0.0417* 0.0436*
(Prob > F) 0.057 0.085 0.1 0.093
Inflation (summed lags) 0.012 ‐0.012 0.006 0.007






















Change in capital requirement ratio (summed lags) ‐0.083** ‐0.149*** ‐0.079** ‐0.072**
(Prob > F) 0.018 0.006 0.027 0.020
DEMAND (summed lags) 0.087 0.033 0.078 0.073
(Prob > F) 0.85 0.94 0.86 0.88
Demand variable Residual z Residual z Residual zR e s i d u a l  z
GDP growth (summed lags) 0.0473* 0.0512** 0.0483* 0.0492*
(Prob > F) 0.065 0.041 0.055 0.055
Inflation (summed lags) ‐0.005 ‐0.007 ‐0.005 ‐0.004











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Panel VAR Estimation 
 
In the main text we used the general specification: 
 
∆l ,         ∑   
 
    ∆KRR ,   +∑   
 
    z ,            ,                               (1) 
 
to investigate the effect of a cumulative change in capital requirements on 
quarterly real lending growth. Given the potential endogeneity problem, we 
controlled for bank-specific conditions that could govern both regulatory changes 
and lending decisions by introducing lags and leads of loan write-offs, and 
demonstrated the robustness of the estimates to these controls.  
A recent study on fiscal policy by Romer and Romer (2010) constructs 
what the authors claim to be an exogenous measure of tax changes in the US. They 
then estimate the effect of tax changes on real GDP growth, under the assumption 
that their measure is indeed exogenous, with a single equation framework. They 
subsequently estimate a VAR treating real GDP growth and their measure of tax 
changes as endogenous variables. The estimated effects on real GDP growth from 
the VAR and the single equation approach are very similar. Furthermore, they 
find that an unexpected shock to output in their VAR does not affect their 
measure of tax changes. Based on these findings, they then conclude that “the tax 
shocks identified from narrative sources are indeed unrelated to past output 
movements”.  In this appendix, we follow a similar procedure andestimate a panel 
VAR to assess whether the results differ from those obtained with the single 
equation approach. 




∆  ,      ∑  
       
       
   
     
∆KRR ,   
∆  ,        
  , 
∆KRR , 
  , 
∆  ,    
  , 
∆KRR , 
  , 
∆  ,     ~    0,        (2) 
 
where ∆KRR ,  and ∆l ,  enter in deviations from their unit-specific mean, which is 
equivalent to removing the bank specific fixed effect.    , 
∆KRR , and   , 
∆  ,  are 
reduced-form error terms which are jointly normally distributed with a mean of 
zero and the variance-covariance matrix  . To understand the effect of a change in 
capital requirements, further assumptions need to be made. In Sims’s (1980) 
seminal article he proposed the Choleski identification scheme, which consists of a 
lower triangular decomposition  of  , with zeros above the diagonal, to give the 
reduced form residuals a structural interpretation. A large literature in monetary 
economics has used this identification scheme, arguing that so long as slow 
moving variables, such as real GDP are ordered above fast moving variables such 
as interest rates, the shock to the interest rate equation can be interpreted as a 
monetary policy shock.32 We adopt this convention here and order the change in 
                                                 
32 See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for more details. 49 
 
capital requirements above real lending growth. In other words we assume that 
the change in capital requirements reacts to real lending growth with a lag: 
 
 
  , 
∆KRR , 
  , 
∆  ,         
10
  
    1  
  , 
∆KRR , 
  , 
∆  ,    
 
We argue that this is an economically justified assumption, as regulators 
typically only observe real lending growth with a lag. In addition, the procedures 
necessary to change an institution’s capital requirement imply that regulators can 
only react with a delay, even if they are able to observe real lending growth 
contemporaneously.  As a result, we can assign a structural interpretation to 
  , 
∆KRR ,  and   , 




   
    1  
∆KRR , 
∆  ,      ∑  
10
   
    1  
       
       
   
     
∆KRR ,   
∆  ,        
  , 
∆KRR , 
  , 
∆  ,      (3) 
 
In general, impulse responses obtained from model (2) and the sum of 
coefficients from the model (1)will not be similar.33 From a comparison of (1) and 
(3) however, it is easy to see that the cumulative sum of coefficients in model (1) 
and the cumulative impulse response to a capital requirement shock,   , 
∆KRR , , over 
the same horizon will be identical in population, if the following four 
requirements are jointly satisfied: i) ∆l ,  is not autoregressive, meaning that 
       0    ; ii)  ∆l ,  does not granger cause ∆KRR , , meaning         0    ; iii) 
∆KRR ,  is not autoregressive, meaning that      0    ; and iv)        
   , 
meaning that the impact coefficient in model (1) is identical to the unbiased 
impact coefficient in the VAR.  
 
Prior to exploring whether the data suggest that these conditions are met, it 
is useful first to discuss some methodological issues that arise in panel VAR 
estimation. One option is to pool the autoregressive coefficients across units, 
assuming identical autoregressive dynamics across all units.34 If that assumption is 
violated, the resulting dynamic heterogeneity bias will typically lead to an upward 
bias in the VAR coefficients (Canova, 2007), meaning that it is easy to mistake a 
temporary effect of a shock for a permanent one. Alternatively, Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) propose the mean group estimator as a solution to the problem of 
heterogeneity in the lagged slope coefficients. This model is implemented by 
estimating the VAR model bank by bank and then averaging the bank-specific 
VAR estimates to obtain the panel estimate.35 But, as demonstrated in Rebucci 
                                                 
33 See Bagliano and Favero (1998) for an elaboration of this point in the context of monetary policy. 
34See Goodhart and Hoffman (2008), Lzzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2010) or Towbin and Weber (2010) for an 
application of this approach. 
35 See Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010) and Sa, Towbin and Wieladek (2011) for an application of this approach 
in the panel VAR context. 50 
 
(2003), with small time series, as in our case, mean group panel VAR estimates 
may be subject to serious small sample bias. The nature of our application thus 
means that either estimator will be subject to econometric bias. 
 
R e c e n t  w o r k  b y  J a r o c i n s k i  ( 2 0 1 0 )  p r o p o s e s  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  
problem. He uses a Bayesian shrinkage approach to shrink every individual bank 
coefficient to a common mean: 
 
  ,                               ~  0,     
Where   ,  is any of the individual VAR bank specific coefficients in model (2),  
      is  the corresponding common mean and    a stochastic error term, reflecting 
the difference between the particular coefficient for bank i and the common 
mean. The covariance matrix of    is split into two parts,   and   .    reflects the 
differences in magnitudes among VAR coefficients and needs to be set by the 
researcher.36  on the other hand is treated as a parameter and inferred from the 
data. That is, the amount of shrinkage, and thus the degree of heterogeneity in the 
lagged slope coefficients, is determined by the data.  
If  =0, then the estimates of this model will be equal to pooled estimates. 
On the other hand, if   ∞ , then this approach will estimate completely separate 
bank specific VAR models. The flexibility of this method thus means that both the 
dynamic heterogeneity and small-sample bias will be minimised. We implement 
this model with Gibbs sampling as in Jarocinski (2010).37 We sample 150,000 
draws from the posterior, with 50,000 as burn in and retain every 100th draw to 
reduce auto-correlation among the draws. This leaves us with 1,000 draws from 
the posterior for inference. We plot the associated values of   in Figure A1. One 
can clearly see that   is fairly small, suggesting a pooled model. Furthermore the 
draws in Figure A1 are clearly uncorrelated, suggesting that each draw is an 
independent draw from the posterior, making these draws therefore suitable for 
inference.   
  
                                                 
36But in contrast to the approach in Jarocinski (2010), who sets    based on unit specific regressions, we set it 
based on pooled panel regressions, as the time horizon for some banks is not long enough to implement his 
approach. 
37Other than the difference in setting   , we follow the approach in Jarocinski (2010) to the letter. Please see his paper for 






Figure A2 plots the impulse responses to a 100 basis points change in capital 
requirements shock and the associated 5th and 95thposterior coverage bands based 
on the 1,000 retained draws. The growth rate in real lending to the real economy 
falls by about 3.8% upon impact and declines back to zero fairly rapidly. In Figure 
A3, we assess the impact of a shock to real lending growth on the change in the 
capital requirement. The effect of a 100 basis point increase in lending growth is 
not significantly different from 0. To investigate the extent to which estimates 
from model (1) are biased, it is also instructive to investigate whether the four 
conditions under which results from both models would be identical hold in the 
population. In Figure A3, the response of real lending growth falls immediately 
back to 0 and the change in capital requirements is not statistically significantly 
different from 0. This suggests that conditions i) and ii) are satisfied. In Figure A2, 
the response of the change in capital requirement declines immediately back to 0 
following impact. Furthermore, the impact response of real lending growth is -
3.82, almost identical to the impact response estimated in model (1) of -3.5. 
Cumulating the real lending growth impulse response up to 3 quarters yields a 
median value of 4.64 - with a 5th and 95th percentile of -9.89 and -.0067, 














respectively, which is a very similar value to the sum of coefficients in model (1) 
of between 6.4 to 7.16. These results suggest that all four conditions are satisfied. 
In summary, the structural VAR model is less restrictive than model (1), 
both in the dynamics of the variables, as well as, conditional on the correct 
identification scheme, with respect to the exogeneity assumption regarding the 
changes in capital requirements variable. The similarity of the estimates from this 
approach to the single-equation approach suggest that, in fact the exclusion 
restrictions necessary for model (1) to provide an unbiased estimate, of the effect 
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